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REPUBLICAN ASCENDANCY: THE
GUBERNATORIAL CAREER OF
JOSHUA LAWRENCE CHAMBERLAIN
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES, 1866-1881
BY MICHAEL BAILEY
Joshua Chamberlain is a revered hero of the Civil War, an icon for both
scholars and the broader public. His life after the Civil War, however, remains largely unexplored. This article uses Chamberlain’s addresses, legislative records, and other primary sources to explore his four-year career
as governor of Maine. Reflecting an interesting national parallel, this article reveals Chamberlain’s rise, his policies, and the consequences of
those policies. Having risen to political prominence with the Republican
Party thanks to the popularity of the Civil War, Chamberlain and his
party enacted a number of policies designed to promote industrialization
and economic growth in Maine. These policies, however, contributed significantly to a growing economic inequality that would then define the
later nineteenth-century “Gilded Age” and spark notable backlash in the
form of the oft-ignored Greenback Party. Michael Bailey is a student at
the University of Maine pursuing a degree in history. His research interests focus on issues pertaining to class in early American history. He has
worked as a state-government Intern for the Maine Department of Labor, where he produced a history of labor laws in the State of Maine for
use by the department and for the state legislature’s reference needs.

INTRODUCTION

G

eneral Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain is a nationally revered
hero of the Civil War; Governor Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, however, is almost completely absent from the extant historiography, both scholarly and popular. e Civil War icon’s four-year
career as governor of Maine, from 1867-1871, is, however, of great historical importance. Most obviously, an understanding of his career as
governor adds nuance and depth to one of the single-most studied participants in the Civil War. More importantly, a closer examination of his
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Image of Governor Joshua Chamberlain. Paralleling the national narrative,
Chamberlain’s gubernatorial career exemplified an o neglected, but vitally important, political change inaugurated in the post-bellum period; he was an exemplar of Maine’s Republican Ascendancy. Collections of the Maine Historical
Society.

gubernatorial career provides a case study of the political climate of the
immediate post-Civil War period in Maine. Paralleling the national narrative, Chamberlain’s gubernatorial career exemplified an o neglected,
but vitally important, political change inaugurated in the post-bellum
period; he was the exemplar of Maine’s Republican Ascendancy.
Because of his leadership in the Civil War, Joshua Chamberlain garnered a prodigious amount of historical interest and scholarship. Most
of this, however, focuses solely on his Civil War exploits. Scant attention
has been given his career as governor. e lack of scholarly attention to
his tenure as governor is perhaps reflective of historiographic trends.
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Most academic historians have moved away from “great white man” political history. But at the same time, scholarly interest in the Civil War
remains strong.1
Although most of Chamberlain’s biographies were written for a
popular audience rather than the academic community, professional
historians are equally guilty of ignoring Chamberlain’s complexities.
For example, the preeminent Civil War historian James McPherson
wrote forewords in two separate collections of primary sources about
Chamberlain’s life. In both he fell prey to the “gallant general” image. In
one, McPherson properly lamented, “e bulk of the several biographies that have been published in the last ten years focus almost entirely
on the war years. Chamberlain’s important careers as governor, educator, and chronicler of the war . . . remain little known.” Ironically, he
then contributed to this lack of knowledge in the second foreword by
celebrating the general as “an appealing hero.” is essay will consider
in more detail, and more critically, Chamberlain‘s gubernatorial career.2
In particular, it will look at another underrepresented aspect of postCivil War Maine history: its class dimensions.3
Chamberlain’s gubernatorial career was emblematic of o-neglected national developments in this era and will therefore shed light on
political and social trends in the post-bellum period.4 Further, a study of
Chamberlain’s career as governor oﬀers insights into his personal life
and the political climate of post-bellum Maine.
The Gubernatorial Career of Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain:
Chamberlain’s gubernatorial career reflected the national narrative
in three significant ways. First, his rise to popularity was enabled by the
popularity of the Union cause, particularly so given his heroics during
the war. Second, his policies aided nascent industrial capitalists in their
desire to spur industrialization and maximize profits. ird, these policies were resisted, though unsuccessfully, by a party that emerged
shortly aer his final term. His career thus provides a deeper understanding of the changes wrought in these formative post-bellum years.
Few individuals enjoyed greater popularity in the Republican Party
aer the Civil War. Chamberlain’s legendary success at Gettysburg,
coupled with the overwhelming support for the Union cause in the
North, made him an ideal gubernatorial candidate for Maine Republicans. Indeed, he repeatedly cited his war record to bolster his popularity, and this, more than any other consideration, secured him the Re-
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In many ways, Chamberlain’s political career resembled that of another famous
Union general: President Ulysses S. Grant. In both cases, Civil War heroics catalyzed their political careers, and both revered generals won executive oﬃces in
the first election aer the Civil War. Prints and Photographs Division, Library
of Congress.

publican nomination. In the general election Chamberlain set the state
record for the widest margin of victory in a gubernatorial race. He broke
his own record two years later, and this still stands as the electoral
record in the state of Maine.
In many ways, Chamberlain’s political career resembled that of another famous Union general: President Ulysses S. Grant. In both cases,
Civil War heroics catalyzed their political careers, and both revered generals, won executive oﬃces in their first elections aer the Civil War.5
e Republican rise to power, however, was not limited to famous generals. In fact, the entire Party achieved nearly uncontested political ascendancy aer the Civil War. As historians Edward Schriver and Stanley Howe noted, “e Republican party emerged from the chaos of the
Civil War years with a strong and unified organization . . . [it] quickly
established control over state politics . . . [and] went on to dominate
Maine political life almost without interruption until . . . 1954.” e
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party controlled the governor’s oﬃce from 1857 to 1878.6 With this enviable political mandate, Chamberlain and the Republicans implemented a number of policies designed to buttress industrialization in
Maine and spur economic growth.
Chamberlain’s economic vision is best understood by examining his
suggestions, adopted and not adopted, in three highly important and interconnected economic sectors. First, he wanted to improve the profitability of Maine’s banking establishments; second, he desired to promote the growth of manufacturing in Maine; and third, perhaps most
characteristic of the time period, he was an unequivocal supporter of expanding railroads across the state. As he said, “[t]here must be Industrial and Financial as well as political reconstruction . . . e fetters must
be struck oﬀ from enterprise and the incubus lied from industry.”
Chamberlain envisioned great economic changes for Maine.7
Improving Maine’s banking and financial institutions would attract
the kind of capital necessary for industrialization and economic growth.
To facilitate this, he suggested increasing the interest rates banks could
charge and eliminating state taxes on banks. e former, he believed,
was needed in order to attract capital investment away from cities such
as New York and Boston; a high interest rate, the argument went, would
allow banking establishments higher profits, and this would attract
them to Maine. e State Legislature eventually, aer significant debate,
agreed on a compromise to raise the maximum interest rate from 5% to
6%. He defended the second reform by arguing that only relief from
taxes would allow saving institutions to earn a profit. e legislature
agreed and passed a law exempting banking institutions. According to
the plan, these changes would attract more capital investments. Chamberlain welcomed these investors: “[w]e need not fear the enterprises of
capitalists from abroad.” eir capital would bring prosperity to Maine,
transforming the state from an agrarian to an industrialized economy.8.
Chamberlain recognized that first and foremost manufacturing
needed workers; capital needed labor. Not unlike the rest of the nation,
Maine’s male population had been significantly reduced by the bloodshed of the Civil War. Exacerbating this problem was a national demographic shi to the West. Maine’s population was, in fact, hit particularly hard by what was then called “Ohio fever.”9 To remedy this,
Chamberlain endorsed programs to encourage Scandinavian immigrants, especially from Sweden.10 In 1868 Chamberlain recommended
that the state hire an agent to recruit families from Scandinavian countries and cover the costs of founding a colony. e following year the
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appointed agent traveled to Norway and Sweden, and a colony was established in 1871. ese meager results cost the taxpayers of the state
$15,624.11
Chamberlain also believed that Maine’s youth needed mechanical
skills, and proposed adding “industrial arts” to the curriculum of the
state’s new agricultural college in Orono. Doing so, he argued, would
encourage pertinent skills for the industrial transformation he desired
for the state’s future. An industrial education, he asserted, “would open
a thousand opportunities” to Maine’s young men.”12
Along with his plans to recruit foreign workers and train Maine’s
male population, he turned his attention to attracting industry-based
capital. e general-turned-governor championed a commission to investigate, publish, and disseminate information regarding the potential
of Maine’s “water declivities.” Doing so, he announced, would “result in
the investment of millions of foreign capital on our hitherto neglected
waters.” is hydrographic survey was a recurring theme in Chamberlain’s addresses, and the legislature accepted his expensive plan, resulting in Walter Wells’s exhaustive survey of the state’s rivers and water
powers completed in 1869.13
To make Maine even more attractive to manufacturing enterprises,
Chamberlain asked for a respite from taxation on industry. e governor hoped to extend an existing law passed in 1864 that enabled Maine’s
cities and towns to exempt a manufacturing enterprise from taxation for
its first ten years. It was Chamberlain's belief, common among Republicans, that the state needed to use whatever powers lay at its disposal to
attract industry. Exempting manufacturers from taxation provided an
incentive to invest, the argument went; industrialists would be more inclined to select Maine as a destination. e legislature passed the bill,
and he signed it into law.14
Chamberlain needed now a means to transport these new manufactured goods and workers across the vast state. e spread of railroads
westward across the nation and the economic promise of this transportation revolution marked the final element in the governor’s economic reform agenda. Each year, the governor dedicated entire segments of his annual speech to the Maine Legislature to the status of
Maine’s railroads. He pointed proudly to the growth of the state’s railroad network and its potential for transporting goods to markets from
the far corners of Maine. At the same time, he lamented the obstacles
faced by railroad companies in the state. Namely, Maine’s large swaths
of unimproved land meant a large amount of track to be laid with little
hope of profitable return.15
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Railroads, he believed, were like banking and manufacturing in that
they needed special support from the state to boost their profitability. In
his first address to the State Legislature, he argued that “outside capitalists [would] not come in to build our railroads” unless Maine made it
profitable for them to do so. Like manufacturers and financial investors,
railroad development rested on a promise of significant profitability
aided by state intervention.16
Governor Chamberlain introduced or encouraged a number of
other initiatives designed for to spur industrialization in Maine. Most
notably he championed a measure to allow the state to lend credit to
private enterprises, specifically designed to apply to railroad enterprises.
He claimed that Maine was “thousands poorer in active population and
millions poorer in money to-day [sic] for this very provision.” is suggestion, however, proved divisive and never received suﬃcient legislative support to be enacted.17 Chamberlain did, however, achieve other
measures designed to promote railroad expansion. One came in 1870
when the state passed a law enabling two or more railroad companies to
consolidate into one single corporation so long as their traﬃc connected. Also of note, and akin to the attempts to attract manufacturing
enterprises, the State Legislature passed a bill exempting shares of capital stock of railroads used for construction from taxation for their first
ten years in operation.18
ese laws were championed on the expectation that railroads
would extend tracks across the state and connect hinterlands to urban
markets, making the entire state more economically viable. Across the
nation railroads were the underpinnings of industrialization, and expansion in Maine promised similar economic vitalization. eir connection to manufacturing and banking was almost self-evident. Railroads without goods to transport made no sense, and without strong
banking institutions, investment for both manufacturing and railroads
would not be forthcoming.

Consequences and Responses:
Chamberlain’s gubernatorial career reflected a national pattern in
Republican politics: attempting to promote economic activity by expanding industrialists’ ability to grow and reap substantial profits. ese
policies favored one class of people against other segments of the population, and across the nation they sparked protests by workers and farmers. Maine was by no means exempt from this civil discord. Where
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Chamberlain insisted on protecting the needs of industrial capitalists,
he preached the necessity of hard-work and frugality for all other Mainers. Where he saw the need for state intervention to encourage the
banking, manufacturing, and transportation sectors, he le workers and
farmers to their own grit and determination.
is was evident with his position regarding the state’s debt. As a
result of the Civil War, both the federal government and the states had
assumed heavy debts. Maine was no diﬀerent. To pay back its debt,
Chamberlain asked for a tax on Maine’s citizens; “Unfortunately,” he
lamented, “our chief resource for the Treasury is taxation of the people.”
us while the state was increasing the tax burden on its citizens, it was
leaving its most profitable industries, the emerging banking, manufacturing, and railroad enterprises, free of the burden of taxation.19
What is further compelling is the contrast between Chamberlain’s
views on the needs of industrial-capital interests and those of Maine’s
agrarians. Chamberlain assumed an interventionist state to help attract
capital investment and industrial development, but in regards to agriculture he repeatedly proclaimed the need for personal responsibility
and hard work, criticizing the supposed widespread “good enough”
mentality that kept farmers from prosperity. . . . “I shall doubt whether
our agriculturalists have that courage and enterprises which our facilities call for,” he oﬀered. For Chamberlain, the plight of Maine’s agriculture was simply a matter of poor work ethic. Capitalists, by contrast, required state support. e needs of an emerging industrial elite were
privileged at the expense of the rest of Maine’s economy.20
By raising the interest rates that banks could charge, the Republican
Party transferred the burden of profitability from banking institutions
onto ordinary Mainers in order to allow banks to earn higher profits.
e state supplied funds to appease or attract capital; it encouraged immigration and industrial training. ese policies were neither disinterested nor frugal. Taxing the people of Maine but not the state’s most
profitable enterprises meant a heavier burden on the working people of
the state.
The Challenge to Republican Ascendancy
In 1868 the State Legislature formed a “Committee on Federal Relations” responsible for determining the state’s position on national issues—particularly those pertaining to the Civil War and its aermath.
e report acknowledged that the national government would have to
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determine a means for paying back its war debts, and that the states
would have to contribute accordingly. It further determined that the national government should have to limit its expenses and “[e]ntirely remove the burdens from the industrial interests of the country, and to tax
only a small number of articles, chiefly luxuries.” In other words, the
Maine State Legislature was suggesting that the federal government, as
the State of Maine was doing, would pay back its debts by taxing the
common citizen and exempting the nation’s most profitable enterprises.
e desire was to promote industrial interests while shiing the burden
of taxation to consumers. e committee’s majority was directly, and
dramatically, challenged by a minority opinion.21
e minority report was published by three indignant state legislators, who argued that current policies were “fast tending to divide the
country into two great classes, of rich and poor, of taxpayers and tax receivers, and must end in bringing on a contest between capital and labor.” e gap between rich and poor was becoming evident in 1868 and
indeed was exacerbated by policies that favored capital vis-à-vis labor
and agriculture. e authors claimed that “monied capital” had a
greater interest in the Civil War than any other, however, “not only did
it contribute less to its sacrifices, but it actually found in the necessities
of the government consequent upon it, the means of unprecedented enrichment.” e economic elite used the Civil War to gain unprecedented wealth, and now their privileged status exacerbated postwar social divisions.22
Labor historian Alan Dawley noted this trend in his study of the
community of Lynn, Massachusetts. Arguing that the patriotism generated by the Civil War led to an unchallenged ascendancy for the Republican Party, Dawley pointed out that “opposition to the business interests behind the Republican party was critically weakened.” e party’s
economic policies, which benefitted America’s emerging economic elite,
went nearly uncontested.23
What Dawley noted in Lynn was not unique. Across the United
States railroad corporations, banking institutions, and manufacturing
establishments expanded dramatically and reaped the rewards of favorable federal policies. Looking at this development from a national perspective, Richard Schneirov argued that “a new coalition committed to
expansion of the domestic economy . . . took power with the victory of
the Republican party. It passed into law a program conducive to rapid
capital accumulation.”24
While Chamberlain’s policies were contested during his adminis-
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tration, substantial resistance did not manifest until its consequences
could be felt. is growing inequality fueled animosities among laborers
and farmers and led to formation of the Greenback Party, a national
third party aer the Panic of 1873. e notable successes of the Greenback Party in Maine attest to two political realities in the post-bellum
period: first, the disaﬀection of thousands of Mainers with the political
and economic status quo; and second, the fact that Mainers, like people
across the nation, did not passively accept the political privileging of the
economic elite. ough the Civil War boosted the power of the Republican Party, the ramifications of its policies mobilized a coalition, though
short lived, of workers and agriculturalists standing against the industrial capitalists interests.25
ough recognized by some historians, the Greenback Party has not
received its due historical attention. Its success in Maine warrants attention because it was brought into being by Chamberlain’s policies. In his
unpublished master’s thesis, Everett Meader explains that the Maine
Greenback Party was especially popular because of the heavy tax burden
on Maine’s citizens. is burden, demonstrated, resulted from policies
championed by Chamberlain that exempted the state’s most profitable
enterprises.26
e Greenback Party failed to make significant headway nationally,
but it did achieve surprising victories in Maine, which is noteworthy because of Maine’s strong Republican leadership and the party’s control
over state politics.27 In Maine the Greenback Party, with its fusionist alliance with the Democratic Party, won control of the Maine State House
of Representatives and won two representatives to the United States
Congress in 1878. Furthermore, the party successfully elected Harris
Plaisted as governor in 1880.28
e Republican Party continued to leverage its Civil War popularity
and criticized the Greenback Party’s cooperation with the “rebel” Democrats. e Republican’s successful candidate for governor in 1879, Daniel
Davis, proclaimed that “the last gun at Appomattox sent booming
through the nation that we were not a confederation of states but a nation.
A solid South aided by a Party anxious for power seeks to reopen this
question of States’ rights. We must now settle this question by the ballot as
we then settled it by the bullet.” e party hoped to frame political elections as a battle first fought with the gun and then at the ballot box.29
In reality, however, the rise of the Greenback Party had nothing to
do with the Civil War. It was almost entirely a backlash against the policies enacted by Chamberlain and his Republican successors. e Green-
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Harris M. Plaisted was elected as Governor of Maine running as a Greenback
Party candidate. e meteoric rise of the Greenback Party and its radical ideology
demonstrate the unpopularity of Governor Chamberlain and his policies designed to favor the state’s economic elite. Collections of Maine Historical Society.

back Party challenged the Republicans’ close relation to capital at the
expense of workers and farmers. is point was expressed unequivocally by one Greenback Party member who claimed that he “le the Republican Party because . . . it favored the rich at the expense of the
poor.” It was also evident in the party’s political base, which was located
chiefly in the agricultural, seaport and shipbuilding centers of the
state.30 It was most evident, however, in the party platform, which advocated paper currency (where the party name originated from), inflationist policies, abolition of debtors’ prison, a progressive income tax, and
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an end all state subsidies—including the tax-exempt status for financial
and industrial enterprises granted by governor Chamberlain. It called
for an inheritance tax and fought for higher taxes on railroads, which
had become taxable enterprises in Maine by the time Governor Plaisted
took oﬃce in 1881. In order to stem the influence of business interests,
the party also campaigned for a smaller state bureaucracy.31
Governor Plaisted, as the leader of the party, espoused the party’s
views on the growing rich-poor divide in his inaugural address to the
legislature. He lamented “the Vanderbilts with tens of millions of U.S.
bonds . . . and the tens of thousands of lesser bond holders, who produce
nothing and do nothing.” He warned that the “monied aristocracy,” if
not controlled, would “rule the country with venial legislatures.” e
Greenback Party’s views on the economy were unequivocal.32
e Greenback Party never controlled the legislature and the executive at the same time, and because of this, it was not able to implement
these policies. Nor was it able to sustain itself; its coalition with the Democratic Party collapsed quickly aer Governor Plaisted’s term in oﬃce.
Nevertheless, the party remains historically important. Its meteoric rise
and its radical ideology demonstrate the unpopularity of Governor
Chamberlain and his policies designed to favor the state’s economic elite.
Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain’s gubernatorial career is a microcosm of post-bellum America. It illuminates an important, yet oen
neglected, epoch in Maine and national history and rounds out our understanding of this popular historical figure.33 e popularity of the
Union cause, exemplified by the heroics of Maine’s most illustrious Civil
War hero, contributed to a nearly uncontested political ascendancy for
the Republican Party over the course of the next century. With this political power, the Republicans enacted numerous policies designed to
enhance the power and profitability of the nascent industrial and financial class. ese policies, however, divided Maine society and exacerbated the gap between this elite and other members of Maine society.
e Greenback Party’s platform and its campaign rhetoric attest to the
widespread resistance this alliance between economic elites and the Republican Party generated. By shiing our attention from Brigadier General Chamberlain, hero of the Civil War, to Governor Chamberlain, architect of industrial privilege, we bring these unexplored but vital
historical realities to light. is shi in focus elucidates the Republican
Party’s policies, its impact on Maine society, and its role in establishing
the basis for what would become known as America’s “Gilded Age.”
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